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Abstract
We revisit the well-known decomposition of the Gini coeﬃcient into between-
groups, within-groups and overlap terms in the context of two groups in which the
incomes in one group may be scaled and that group’s population weight modiﬁed. In
this more general setting than usual, we focus on the properties of the overlap term,
proving inter alia that overlap unambiguously reduces as a result of a within-group
progressive transfer, and is increased by scaling up the incomes in the group with
the lower mean, reaching a maximum when the two means become the same. In
the case of a socially heterogeneous population and equivalized incomes, the eﬀect
on the Gini overlap of changing the income unit is determined, along with that of
adjusting the equivalence scale deﬂator in case the income unit is the equivalent
adult (such adjustment simultaneously changing the weighting of income units).
Relationships of the ﬁndings to existing literature are thoroughly explored.
JEL Number:D 6 3
Keywords:G i n ic o e ﬃcient, inequality decomposition, Gini residual
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
When the Gini coeﬃcient of income inequality is decomposed into between-groups and
within-groups contributions, it is well-known that a residual term arises if the subgroup
income ranges overlap. What is more, the overlap term can be very signiﬁcant. In his
oft-cited paper on the world income distribution, for instance, Milanovic (2002) reports
for 1993 an overlap term of 6.8 in a total Gini of 57.8 points for the world as a whole
(page 78). For some parts of the world the overlap term even accounts for the biggest
contribution to total inequality: for Latin America and the Carribean, for instance, the
overlap contributes 30.3 points out of a total Gini of 55.6; and for Western Europe,
North America and Oceania, 19.4 out of 36.6 Gini points (pages 68, 69). It is strange,
though, that when reaching the section in his paper in which he seeks to explain levels
∗The authors thank Bart Capéau, Jean-Yves Duclos, Udo Ebert, Branko Milanovic and Shlomo
Yitzhaki for valued comments.
1and trends of world inequality, Milanovic lists three questions to be answered, of which
none is related directly to the overlap term.1 Or maybe this is less surprising than one
might think. Indeed, for both the between-group and the within-group contributions to
total inequality as measured by the Gini, Milanovic explicitly relies on the analytical
expression for these terms, and is able to interpret the changes between 1988 and 1993
in terms of the change in the factors making up these expressions. But not so for the
overlap term, simply because so little is known about it.2 Contrary to his detailed and
deductive analysis of the changes in the between and within components, Milanovic
relies on intuition along with some simulations to interpret overlap behaviour (see on),
and remarks that "every synthetic index of inequality, and the Gini is no exception to
that, is a very complex statistic" (page 80). Needless to say, then, there is plenty of
room - and need - for some more analytical underpinning of the behaviour of the Gini
overlap term. That is the purpose of our paper.
The Gini decomposition was ﬁrst explored by Bhattacharya and Mahalanobis (1967),
where an interpretation for the residual R was given in terms of concentration areas (page
150). Pyatt (1976) found an interpretation in terms of the expected value of a game,
claiming an extension of existing understanding "if only at the level of psychological
novelty" (page 251). Mookherjee and Shorrocks (1982) complained of R as an "awkward
interaction eﬀect... impossible to interpret with any precision, except to say that it is the
residual necessary to maintain the identity" (page 889). An interpretation in terms of
reranking can be found in Silber’s (1989) matrix-theoretic study (page 112). In Lambert
and Aronson (1993), R is shown to measure a sub-area of the Lorenz diagram. In Giorgi
(1990, 1993) can be found much detailed background material and also an interesting
history of the Gini decomposition. In Zagier (1983), upper and lower bounds for the
overall Gini in terms of the component Ginis are investigated. The literature of the
1970s and beyond has also seen the emergence of "decomposable" inequality indices for
which no residual term arises.3
1The three questions are: "i) what lies behind the very high between-country component of inequality;
ii) why is the ’pure’ within-country inequality component in the Gini coeﬃcient so small, and iii) what
drove the increase of 2.7 Gini points in the between-country component which was the main factor
behind the increase in the overall world inequality?" (op. cit., page 78)
2The closest Milanovic gets (and it is a fair attempt) is to link the overlap term with the discussion
of the within-group component: "Thus any [within] inequality above 0 will ’feed’ the overlap component
and detract from ’within’ component. Or, in other words, the overlap component will be small only if
i) mean incomes are very far (diﬀerent) from each other, or ii) individual country distributions are very
equal." (op. cit., page 83). And consider also this: "Another question [...] is, how sensitive world Gini
is to distributional changes within countries [...]. The answer is that it is sensitive although most of the
change may occur through the overlap component" (page 83 again).
3See Bourguignon (1979), Shorrocks (1980), Cowell (1980), Cowell and Kuga (1981) and Shorrocks
(1984) for the development of these indices, Kuga (1980) for consideration of their “alikeness” with the
Gini coeﬃcient, and Ebert (1988) for a characterization of the Gini and generalized entropy family as
the unique inequality indices satisfying “non-overlapping decomposability”.
2In analyzing the Gini decomposition here more deeply than before, we shall take the
opportunity also to provide results for cases in which mutually exclusive and exhaus-
tive subgroups are deemed “relevantly diﬀerent” (to use the language of Cowell, 1980,
who ﬁrst set such an agenda, albeit for decomposable inequality indices). We shall in
fact accommodate two distinct types of transformation in this paper, in order to have
ﬂexibility in taking account of relevant diﬀerences. One is to scale the incomes of one
group relative to the other (Cowell cites diﬀerences in family size or in price levels be-
tween the groups as cases where scaling may be appropriate). The other is to change
the importance of a group by modifying relative weightings (for example, to induce a
greater sensitivity to inequality amongst the old than the young).We shall introduce
parameters to enable us to eﬀect such transformations. The scaling and weighting para-
meters are in principle independent, although as Ebert (1997) has demonstrated, in the
case that scaling incomes in one group corresponds to equivalizing, a concomitant and
identical weighting adjustment is required if a certain rich-to-poor transfer principle is
to be respected by the overall inequality measure. In the degenerate case of no scaling
or weighting, our methodology generates results for the traditional decomposition of the
Gini coeﬃcient over a homogeneous population. We conﬁne attention throughout for
simplicity to the case of two population subgroups, but little of substance is lost by this.
2 Notation and preliminaries
Let there be two subgroups, which we shall call “a”a n d“ b”. These could stand for
regions or any other socioeconomic partition of the population. In some of what follows,
the two groups will be termed “singles” and “couples”, a convenient way of referring to
the special case in which “a” and “b” represent subpopulations comprising households
with diﬀerent needs (e.g. based on household size). As another convenience of language,
we shall describe income units as “households” throughout the paper.
Let there be Na households of type a,a n dNb households of type b.L e t Fa(x)
and Fb(x) be the distribution functions, and fa(x) and fb(x) the density functions, for
money income x in the two groups. We shall suppose that the distribution functions are
continuous on [0,∞).L e t
µa =
Z
[1 − Fa(x)]dx and µb =
Z
[1 − Fb(x)]dx (1)
be the respective means, and Ga and Gb the Gini coeﬃcients, for money income, where
µaGa =
Z
[1 − Fa(x)]Fa(x)dx and µbGb =
Z
[1 − Fb(x)]Fb(x)dx (2)
We suppose that the money incomes of members of group “b”a r ed e ﬂated by a factor
m relative to those in group “a” for the purposes of aggregation. In the literal case of
singles and couples, the scaling could represent equivalizing. Indeed, we shall often refer
3to scaled income as “living standard” in what follows, again for convenience of language
in general. Thus a household of type a with money income x has living standard y = x




We shall also make a weighting modiﬁcation in group “b”, designed to accord with the
business of resort to “equivalent adults” in the living standards scenario (Ebert, 1997),
as already intimated, but also to cater for other concerns, such as the one expressed
by Ravallion (2004) in the context of inequality decomposition across countries: “Some
sort of hybrid weighting scheme is called for, derived from an explicit assumption on the
weight one attaches to country identity in assessing individual welfare... the appropriate
weights will be products of population weights and these country-speciﬁc factors” (page
13).
Thus, we create an artiﬁcal, merged population of Na +qNb income units, one from
each household of type a and q from each type b household. The parameter q, which need
not be an integer, adjusts the numerical importance of the respective types in the overall
population. In the literal case of singles and couples, by setting q =1we would focus
on household living standards; q =2would correspond to the per capita distribution of
living standards, and q = m would give us the distribution of living standards among
equivalent adults, ﬁctional beings of whom there are m in each couple-household and 1
in each single-person household. For ease of language, henceforth we shall also call our






be the proportion of type a households in the merged population of ﬁctional adults. The
distribution function H(y) for living standards y in the merged population is deﬁned by
H(y)=θFa(y)+( 1− θ)Fb(my) (4)
The mean µY and Gini coeﬃcient GY for living standards among ﬁctional adults satisfy
µY =
Z
[1 − H(y)]dy = θµa +
(1 − θ)µb
m
and µY GY =
Z
[1 − H(y)]H(y)dy (5)
If we denote overall inequality when X is the money income distribution, and a
deﬂator m and weighting factor q are used as above, as I(X,m,q) in general, then in
our particular case, we have I(X,m,q) = GY . Such a measure I(•,m,q) is partially
symmetric for X in Cowell’s (1980) terminology (except in the degenerate case m = q =1
when it is fully symmetric). Cowell focused on decomposable inequality indices; we
proceed here in terms of the Gini.
43 The Gini decomposition
The central results in this paper all come by substituting from (2) into (5), enabling us






(Proofs of this and a number of other analytical assertions, to follow, are sketched in
the Appendix). This decomposition of “mean times one plus the Gini”, in which the
weights on the two within-group terms and the balancing item (namely,θ2, (1−θ)2 and
2θ(1 − θ)) sum to unity, has not been seen in previous literature.4 Let ϕ be the share
















The well-known Gini decomposition into between group, within group and overlap terms
is this:5
GY = θϕGa +( 1− θ)(1 − ϕ)Gb + GBET + R, (8)
where GBET is the between-groups Gini, which is formally deﬁned in (10a) - (10b)
ahead, and R is, of course, the residual term. Dividing in (6) by µY , and using (7), the
implied decomposition of 1+GY begins similarly, but has a ﬁnal term which evidently
subsumes the between-group and overlap eﬀects:





The overlap term R in (8) is at once a between-groups and a within-groups eﬀect:
it measures a between-groups phenomenon, overlapping, that is generated by inequality
4If we measure welfare as average utility, according to the imposed utility-of-income function of
a social decision-maker who attributes altruism to income units (Lambert, 1985), then the inputs to
social utility are people’s living standards in their group and the positions of those in the group who
are less fortunate than them. For the groups “a”a n d“ b”, we have Wa =
U
y[1 − kFa(x)]fa(x)dx =
µa[1 −
1
2k(1 + Ga)] (in which y = x), and Wb =
U









) respectively; and overall, WY =
U
y[1 − kH(y)]h(y)dy = µY [1 −
1
2k(1 + GY )],w h e r e
h(y) is the density function corresponding to H(y). In all of these, the parameter k ≤ 1 measures the
strength of the altruism motive relative to that of own living standard. See Lambert (2001, pp. 124-5)
for more on this. Now write Wa = µa−Ea, Wb =
µb
m
−Eb and WY = µY −EY , so that the E’s measure
respectively the welfare costs of inequality among type a households, among type b households and







[1 − Fb(my)Fa(y)]dy. Hence (6) tells us that the cost of inequality in the merged
population of ﬁctional adults is a weighted average of within-group components and a between-groups
term.
5For a review of other subgroup decompositions of the Gini coeﬃcient, which have variously been
attempted using diﬀerent weights, but have gained no favour, see Das and Parikh (1982, pp. 30-34).
5within groups. Mishra and Parikh (1992) call R the "across-groups" contribution to the
Gini coeﬃcient, which echoes Nygård and Sandström (1981), for whom GBET +R is the
across-groups component and who reserve the term "between groups" for entropy indices
for which subgroup means tell the whole between-groups story (page 312). Mookherjee
and Shorrocks (1982) complain, in respect of the residual R,t h a t" t h ew a yi nw h i c h
it reacts to changes in the subgroup characteristics is so obscure that it can cause the
overall Gini value to respond perversely to such changes" (page 891). Shorrocks and Wan
(2004) call R a“ p o o r l ys p e c i ﬁed” element of the Gini decomposition. Milanovic (2002),
in contrast, seems comfortable with the overlap contribution to the Gini decomposition,
describing it in the context of world inequality analysis as measuring the degree of
homogeneity within regions: “the more important the overlapping component... the
less one’s income depends on where she lives” (page 70). Milanovic also attributes
an increase in world overlap over time to the changing situations in India and China,
occurring as “more people from these poor countries ‘mingle’ with people from rich
countries” (page 84). By comparing the right hand sides of (8) and (9), a transparent
analytical expression for R obtains, rendering this residual amenable to detailed and
formal investigation, perhaps for the ﬁrst time.6
4 Properties of the Gini overlap term
By straightforward geometry using the Lorenz diagram that obtains when each income


















(again see the Appendix). We can identify several interesting properties of the overlap
from equations (8)-(9) and (10a)-(10b).7 These concern situations of no overlap between
the subgroup income ranges, and also the eﬀects on R of within-group money transfers,
of scaling the incomes in one group relative to those in the other, and of changing the
weighting parameter q in the nominated group “b”. We deal with these issues in turn.
6In the case m =1 , the integral in (9) has close ties to Mehran’s (1975) “inequality across two
distributions” (pages 146-7) and to Gini’s concept of transvariation, on which see Dagum (1997) and
Deutsch and Silber (1997). In Yitzhaki (1988) and Yitzhaki and Lerman (1991), a covariance-based
decomposition of the Gini coeﬃcient has been developed, in which the overlap term has been analyzed
deeply and shown to measure stratiﬁcation among socioeconomic groups.










[1 − Fa(y)]dy −
U
[1 − Fb(my)]dy = µa −
µb
m .
64.1 No overlap between the subgroup income ranges
As is well-known, the Gini residual R is zero if the income ranges of the two groups
do not overlap. This result can readily be seen from (10a)-(10b). Set m =1ﬁrst for
simplicity, so that there is no scaling. If there is no overlap, clearly µa 6= µb;i fµa <µ b
then Fb(y)Fa(y)=Fb(y) ∀y and if µa >µ b then Fb(y)Fa(y)=Fa(y) ∀y (just consider
the conﬁguration of subgroup distribution functions in the two cases). These reduce to
[1 − Fb(y)]Fa(y)=0and [1 − Fa(y)]Fb(y)=0respectively, and so R =0from (10a) or
(10b). The same argument exactly works in the presence of scaling (m 6=1 )i fi ti st h e
subgroups’ living standard ranges which do not overlap.
4.2 Within-group money transfers
Now let one of the component income distributions change. Speciﬁcally, consider these
two scenarios, in which rich-to-poor money income transfers take place within one group:
(a) Fa(x) changes, to ¯ Fa(x) say, which has the same mean and Lorenz dominates, with
Fb(x) held ﬁxed; and (b) Fb(x) changes to ¯ Fb(x), which has the same mean and Lorenz
dominates, with Fa(x) held ﬁxed.
We can determine the eﬀects of these transfers on R more easily from (8)-(9) than
from (10a)-(10b). First, the eﬀects on the overall Gini coeﬃcient for living standards
are these, from (8):
∆aGY =2 ϕ.∆Ga + ∆aR and ∆bGY =( 1− θ)(1 − ϕ).∆Gb + ∆bR (11)
respectively, since in each case GBET is unaﬀected. The ﬁr s tt e r mi ne a c he x p r e s s i o ni s
clearly negative. First diﬀerence in (9), now, and compare with (11). Regardless of the
conﬁguration of means, the changes in R are, respectively,
∆aR =2 θ(1 − θ)
R
Fb(my)[Fa(y) − ¯ Fa(y)]dy
µY
and ∆bR =2 θ(1 − θ)
R
[Fb(my) − ¯ Fb(my)]Fa(y)]dy
µY
(12)




[Fa(x) − ¯ Fa(x)]dx and Sb(y)=
Z y
0
[Fb(x) − ¯ Fb(x)]dx ∀y (13)
satisfy the following properties:
Sa(y) ≥ 0,∀y & Sa(z)=0 and Sb(y) ≥ 0,∀y & Sb(z)=0 , (14)
where z is any income level in excess of the highest present in either sub-distribution
before any transfers take place (see Atkinson, 1970, or Lambert, 2001 pages 52-55, on
7this). Hence, re-expressing (12) in terms of S0
a(y) and S0
bN(y) respectively, and using
integration by parts, we have











both of which are non-positive. Therefore overlap cannot rise as the result of a within-
group rich-to-poor money transfer.
In fact we can say slightly more. Inspecting the right-hand-side integrals in (15), we
see that overlap will fall unless the range of living standards across which the transfer
takes place within one group is absent for the other group.8 Within-group progressive
money transfers thus work to reduce the Gini coeﬃcient for living standards in the
overall population of ﬁctional adults by means of two reinforcing eﬀects.9 One eﬀect of
course comes directly from the within-group inequality reduction: ∆Ga < 0, respectively
∆Gb < 0. To our knowledge, it has not previously been demonstrated that overlap
also reduces as a result of such transfers (where these occur in the region of overlap),
although the result is, of course, intuitive. Indeed, Milanovic (2002) clearly appreciates
the position: “For example, if we let US, UK and German distributions experience
regressive transfers.... world Gini in 1993 increases by 0.4 Gini points, 0.3 of which is
due to the greater overlap” (page 83).
4.3 Scaling the incomes in one group
How does the overlap term behave if we would move one of the two subgroup income
distributions “on top of” the other, by an appropriate scaling? We can examine this
question most easily by setting q =1in the analytics and regarding m as simply a
scaling parameter for the couples’ incomes rather than speciﬁcally as an equivalence






It seems intuitively reasonable that overlap should be at a maximum in this case. Figure
1 (taken from Lambert and Aronson, 1992) shows a situation in which this indeed
happens. The graph plots the overall Gini, the within-groups contribution, the between-
groups Gini and the residual, when the two sub-distributions are lognormal with a
common variance of logarithms and means
µb
m
and µa, as the scaling parameter m is
8When a transfer is made in a distribution F from an income unit with income v,s a y ,t oo n ew i t h
income u<v , the new distribution function ¯ F only diﬀers from F on the range (u,v). The corresponding




Sb(my)fa(y)dy in (15) could be zero, and would be if (and only if) the frequency
density in the unaﬀected group were zero in the relevant range of living standards.
9It is clear that GY must reduce, since within-group money transfers represent transfers of equivalent
income in the ﬁctional population, whatever the value of q. We shall address the issue of between-group
money transfers in section 5.
8varied. Overlap rises sharply to a maximum at m = m∗, at which point the means are
equated (
µb
m∗ = µa). Obviously, the between-groups Gini falls to zero at this point; the
overall Gini also appears to be minimized when m = m∗.
To investigate the general case analytically, note that (10a) deﬁnes R when m>m ∗
and (10b) deﬁnes R when m<m ∗. In (10b), the numerator of R is increasing in m
and the denominator is decreasing in m. It follows that
∂R
∂m
> 0 for m<m ∗.T a k i n g
the logarithm of R and diﬀerentiating with respect to m in (10a), it follows (after a
little manipulation, see the Appendix) that
∂R
∂m
< 0 when m>m ∗. Clearly R is not
diﬀerentiable at m = m∗.T h i sv e r i ﬁes that R reaches a peak at m = m∗ in all cases.
Letting m → m∗ in either (10a) or (10b), so that µY → µa =
µb
m∗, the maximum value
of R,c a l li tR∗,i sg i v e na s





showing the dependency of the maximum value of R on the population share θ.T h e
highest possible overlap, given the two distribution functions, occurs when θ = 1
2.
In Lambert and Aronson (1993), it was suggested that the Gini residual would




between these means, it would also be higher the larger the coeﬃcients
of variation of the two sub-distributions. The results of this section plainly accord with
those speculations, proving the former of the two, and also proving that the eﬀect of a
mean-preserving spread or contraction (which of course raises or lowers the coeﬃcient
of variation) is as envisaged.
In case the two distributions diﬀer only by scale, and are identical when m = m∗,a s
in the example upon which Figure 1 is based, we have Fb(my) ≷ Fa(y) for m ≷ m∗ ∀y
and Ga = Gb. The maximum value of the overlap is then R∗ =2 θ(1 − θ)Ga (from (17)
and (2)). It can be veriﬁed that
∂R
∂m
→ θ(1 − θ)
[(1 − 2θ)Ga − 1]




→ θ(1 − θ)
[(1 − 2θ)Ga +1 ]
m∗ > 0 as m % m∗ (18b)
in this case (see the Appendix). For the example in Figure 1, in fact, Ga ≈ 0.276 and
θ = 2
3 (with m∗ = q =1 ).
The proﬁles of the within-groups term θϕGa +( 1− θ)(1 − ϕ)Gb,c a l li tW,a n d
the overall Gini GY suggested by Figure 1 are not speciﬁc to the particular numerical















.10 When the distributions
10Note by comparing (8) and (9) that GBET + R is a diﬀerentiable function of m in general.
9Figure 1: Overall Gini and the three components for varying m (with m∗ =1 ). Common

































diﬀer only by scale, so that (18a) - (18b) holds,
∂W
∂m
=( 2 θ −1)Ga.
∂ϕ
∂m






is positive and decreasing in m.H e n c ei fθ>1
2, W is increasing and concave
in m (as in our example) and if θ<1
2, Wis decreasing and convex in m.A sm → m∗,
∂W
∂m
→ θ(1 − θ)(2θ − 1)Ga. Combining (18a)-(18b) with the result of diﬀerentiating







θ(1 − θ)(1 − 2θ)Ga. Hence
∂GY
∂m
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
m=m∗
=0 , as in Figure 1, whatever the values of θ
and Ga.T h i sﬁnding could not be expected if the two distributions do not diﬀer only
by scale. See Figure 2, which is a similar plot to Figure 1, but for a case in which Ga
and Gb diﬀer.
4.4 Changing the weighting parameter q
How will changes in the weighting parameter q aﬀect the Gini decomposition? For
example, in the case of singles and couples, suppose we move from household living
standards to equivalent adult living standards, and thence to per capita living standards;
each transition requires an increase in q (assuming m<2, which would be usual for an
10Figure 2: Overall Gini and the three components for varying m (with m∗ =1 ). Standard







































equivalence scale); what happens to overlap, in particular? One’s intuition may ﬂag at
this point, but the mathematics do not.










µY (θ − ϕ)
q





R(θ + ϕ − 1)
q
(19)
in both cases. In other words, the elasticity of the Gini residual to changes in q is simply
θ+ϕ−1. This can be positive or negative depending on the relationship between θ and
ϕ.11
What is the eﬀect on overlap of concomitantly raising the equivalence scale deﬂator




and ϕ ≥ θ), R rises when the weighting factor on couple-households is increased
if singles account for more than 50% of the (weighted) population (θ>
1
2). In the case that singles are
on average worse-oﬀ than couples (µa ≤
µb
m
and θ ≥ ϕ), R falls when q is raised if singles are in the
minority (θ<
1






: increasing q causes R to rise
if θ>
1
2 and to fall if θ<
1
2. For the UK in 1985/6, in fact, the single were better-oﬀ than the married
in equivalent income terms despite being worse-oﬀ in money income terms (Lambert, 1993)







¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
q=m






¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
q=m
> 0 (20)
(details are in the Appendix). Let m∗ be the equivalence scale deﬂator that would
make the two groups equally well-oﬀ on average. If the singles are better-oﬀ than the
couples (m>m ∗), overlap in living standards of equivalent adults will fall when m
is raised (along with q), and if the singles are worse-oﬀ (m<m ∗), overlap in living
standards of equivalent adults will rise when m is raised (along with q). These results
are directionally the same as those for changes in m alone. Evidently, the concomitant
change in the deﬁnition of the income unit q cannot overcome this eﬀect.
5 Connections with existing literature
In this section of the paper, we reassess some existing inequality literature in light of
the new information we have gained on the Gini decomposition. The papers of Paglin
(1975), Foster and Shneyerov (2000), Cubel and Lambert (2002), Federov (2002) and
Shorrocks and Wan (2004) all relate to scenarios in which there is no weighting of
income units. They address respectively: the age-Gini, an alternative conception of
within-group inequality, residual-progression-neutral income tax reforms, polarization,
and the eﬀect of changes in group membership. In all cases (with q =1in our analytics),
our constructions shed new light. The papers of Cowell (1980) and Ebert (1997) relate
to situations in which subgroup importances are varied by means of a weighting scheme,
and our analytics for these cases (in which q 6=1 )a l s ot u r nu ps o m en e wi n s i g h t s .
Not least, in the case of group-to-group lump-sum transfers, we uncover a little-known
measure of Gastwirth (1975) for earnings diﬀerentials, and its link to a more recent
construction in the same vein of Milanovic and Yitzhaki (2002) which assesses relative
well-being between countries or groupings of countries.
Turning ﬁrst to cases for which q =1 , so that the importance attributed to each
group depends only upon its population weight (and income share, since we are dealing





so that p = θ when q =1 . We turn subsequently to scenarios in which group importances
may be varied through use of the parameter q.
There are two immediate applications for the case we have just considered, of scaling
the incomes in one sub-distribution relative to those in the other.
First, consider a residual-progression-neutral income tax reform, from which one
group beneﬁts and the other loses, shown in Cubel and Lambert (2002) to be welfare-
improving in a wide set of circumstances despite introducing horizontal inequity. In such
12a case, the post-tax incomes in one sub-distribution are scaled relative to those in the
other, narrowing relative income diﬀerentials between the groups on average. Let t(x)
be the original income tax schedule. If the groups a and b are such that µa <µ b,w e
consider a small residual-progression-neutral tax cut in group a, and hike in group b,t h e
post-tax incomes becoming (1+ρ)[x−t(x)] in a and (1−λ)[x−t(x)] in b where ρ and λ
are such that θρµa =( 1−θ)λµb (i.e. total income tax revenue remains the same). This
reform does not aﬀect inequality within either group, and reduces inequality between
groups provided (1+ρ)µa and (1−λ)µb are closer together than µa and µb. From (8) and
(10a), the eﬀect on the overall Gini coeﬃcient is ∆GY = ∆ϕ[θGa − (1 − θ)Gb − 1]+∆R
(where, since ϕ = θ
µa
µY
,w eh a v e∆ϕ = ρϕ). Thus the redistributive eﬀect of the tax
change, as measured by the reduction in the Gini coeﬃcient, has two components, a
positive one, ∆ϕ[1 + (1 − θ)Gb − θGa], stemming from the narrowing of the income
gaps on average, and a negative one, −∆R, stemming from the increased horizontal
inequity (recalling that ∆R>0 since the reform moves the two means closer together).
12
As a second application of the scaling exercise, note that the scaling when m = m∗
is à la Foster and Shneyerov (2000), according to whom the resultant overall Gini coef-
ﬁcient, call it GY |m=m∗, would be the appropriate measure of within-groups inequality
in the unscaled overall distribution, were the Gini to be a path-independent inequality
measure. Setting m =1in (8), so that there is no scaling, we have
GY = pϕGa +( 1− p)(1 − ϕ)Gb + GBET + R. (22)
Setting m = m∗ (in which case, ϕ becomes equal to p)i n( 9 ) ,w eﬁnd that
GY |m=m∗ = p2Ga +( 1− p)2Gb + R∗ (23)
where R∗ is the maximum overlap. Then, subtracting,
GY − GY |m=m∗ = GBET +( ϕ − p)[pGa − (1 − p)Gb] − [R∗ − R] (24)
which is not a pure between-groups term, conﬁrming that the Gini is not path-independent.
The term GY − GY |m=m∗ subsumes the traditional between-groups Gini, but is “pol-




and by overlap (to the extent that this is not already maximal).
In the case that “a” and “b” represent two age groups, rather than two diﬀerent
household types, GY −GBET measures the so-called Paglin-Gini, call it GPAG,p r o p o s e d
by Paglin (1975) as appropriate for capturing non-age-induced inequality in longitudinal
12If any income value x − t(x) is common to the two groups before imposition of the tax change,
unequal treatment of equals — and reranking, a change in overlap - is inevitably introduced by the
reform. See Cubel and Lambert (2002) for more on such tax reforms, and Lambert (2001, chapter 10)
for more on reranking per se.
13studies. Labelling the groups such that µa ≤ µb without loss of generality, and setting
m =1for no scaling, so that (10b) deﬁnes the overlap term R,w eh a v ef r o m( 8 )t h a t :





The publication of Paglin’s subsequently much-cited paper led to a string of comments,
all with replies by Paglin (1977, 1979, 1989). Whilst Paglin agreed with Nelson (1977)
that in (25), pϕGa+(1−p)(1−ϕ)Gb clearly measures inequality within the age groups,
he disagreed with Nelson over the presence of the interaction term, eloquently defending
its inclusion in his measure on welfare grounds (Paglin, 1977, p. 523). In an exchange
with Wertz (1979), the idea of measuring non-age-induced inequality as GY
¯ ¯
m=m∗ rather
than GPAG was mooted, where m∗ is the scaling factor which would remove age eﬀects
on average, but not advocated (Paglin, 1979, p. 674). As is evident from (23), this
alternative measure would overstate interaction eﬀects (albeit with changed weights on
the constituent terms).13
Let “a” and “b” be any two groups. Shorrocks and Wan (2004) point out that, so
long as there is an overlap between the group income ranges, a simple distributional
change can always be devised that will preserve GY and increase GBET. Again label the
groups such that µa ≤ µb and set m =1 . Choose two income units in the overlap, one
in “a”, having income u say, and one in “b” having income v<u . (These exist or else
the overlap is empty). Now simply permute the two income levels, so that the group
memberships of the income units concerned are eﬀectively swapped (equivalently, add
u − v to v and take u − v away from u). GBET is raised by this (since µa falls and µb
rises), which is Shorrocks and Wan’s point. Our analytics allow us to say deﬁnitively
that R is reduced (as is intuitive). From (10b) the eﬀect on R is





since µY is invariant to the permutation. This eﬀect is negative since Fa(y) rises and
Fb(y) falls for y ∈ [v,u] and both are unaﬀected for y/ ∈ [v,u].14
Fedorov (2002) analyzes regional inequality for Russia using GBET, and also stud-
ies polarization in terms of the measures presented in Wolfson (1994) and Esteban
and Ray (1994) which have close connections with the Gini coeﬃcient. The trends
13If incomes changed equiproportionately from the ﬁrst age cohort to the second, so that Ga = Gb
and R
∗ =2 p(1 − p)Ga as earlier, then GY |m=m∗ = Ga from (23), whilst GPAG would still contain
interaction eﬀects. If the two age-groups had identical income distributions (so that m
∗ =1and ϕ = p),
then GPAG would perfectly capture within-age-group inequality only: GPAG = Ga.
14The eﬀect on within-group inequality, which equals −[∆GBET +∆R] from (9) since ∆GY =0 ,m a y
be positive or negative. For small income changes, the component Gini coeﬃcients Ga and Gb go up or
down depending on the ranks Fa(u) and Fb(v) at which the respective changes take place. Speciﬁcally,
if Na and Nb are large, then ∆Ga ≷ 0 according as Fa(u) ≷
1
2(1 + Ga) and ∆Gb ≷ 0 according as
Fb(v) ≷
1
2(1 + Gb). See Lambert and Lanza (2003) for more on this.
14in interregional inequality and polarization were found to be “remarkably similar” by
Fedorov (page 449), prompting him to wonder if the two polarization measures are ca-
pable of yielding additional insight.15 Esteban et al. (1999) propose an extension of
the Esteban and Ray (1994) measure, having an additional (negative) term involving
GY − GBET, thereby taking into account both within-group dispersion and overlap.16
Rodriguez and Salas (2003) show that in the case of two groups (let us say, our “a”
and “b”) separated by the median income, call this µ0, the Wolfson (1994) measure
equals 2
µY
µ0 [GBET − pϕGa − (1 − p)(1 − ϕ)Gb], thus capturing bi-polarization by the
diﬀerence between within-group and between-group inequality (there is no overlap in
this case). Zhang and Kanbur (2001) propose to measure polarization generally by the
ratio of between-group inequality to within-group inequality, using a decomposable in-
dex. This eﬀectively means that changes in polarization are determined by changes in
between-group inequality and in overall inequality. If one wanted group overlap to ﬁgure
explicitly in polarization, negatively of course, then the natural Gini-based version of
Zhang and Kanbur’s measure would be
GBET
pϕGa +( 1− p)(1 − ϕ)Gb + R
; if overlap should
not ﬁgure at all,
GBET
pϕGa +( 1− p)(1 − ϕ)Gb
could be used; variants could also be devised
which would instead use GY |m=m∗ in the denominator for the within-group eﬀect.
We turn now to scenarios in which subgroup importances are varied by means of the
parameter q. Ebert (1997) considered four methods of adjusting income distributions
for relevant diﬀerences, corresponding in our literal scenario of singles and couples to:
(i) q = m =1 ;( i i )q = m =2 ; (iii) q =2 ,m = mo ;a n d( i v )q = m = mo (where
mo is the appropriate equivalence scale deﬂator, mo < 2). His favoured method, (iv),
the one in which equivalent adults are created,17 accords with a progressive transfer
15In Duclos et al. (2004), signiﬁcant diﬀerences are found between the polarization and inequality
rankings of a number of countries by (a reformulation of) the Esteban and Ray (1994) measure and by
the overall Gini, GY .
16The extended measure includes that presented in Wolfson (1994) as a special case. In both in-
tertemporal and international comparisons, the extended measure is found by Esteban et al. to yield
diﬀerent conclusions than those obtaining for overall inequality using GY . For a discussion of how over-
lapping enters naturally into the measurement of polarization, see Gradin (2000, pp. 463-464). For the
distinction between polarization and bi-polarization (tendency towards bimodality), see Wang and Tsui
(2000), Rodriguez and Salas (2003) and Gradin (2003), in the ﬁrst two of which classes of polarization
i n d i c e se n j o y i n gs t r o n gc o n n e c t i o n sw i t ht h a ti nW o lfson (1994) are presented. See also Chakravarty
and Majumder (2001) for a welfare-based extension of the Wolfson measure.
17Fictional adults are not popular among some practitioners: “there seems little point in... treating
the family as n
∗[= m] units... this appears to suggest that the importance of an individual’s economic
welfare is a function of the equivalence scale value of the income unit in which he or she resides...
Equivalent adults do not exist, unlike families or individuals" (O’Higgins et al, 1990, p. 26). Decoster
and Ooghe (2003) discuss and compare methods (i), (iii) and (iv), using graphic examples, and go on to
analyze a proposed Belgian personal income tax reform using each of the three methods. They ﬁnd that
method (iv) “leads to quite fanciful results with respect to the choice of equivalence scales... although
this method is normatively interesting” (page 189).
15principle he articulates according to which a small money transfer from a household in
one group to a household in the other, with a lower living standard, is welfare-improving
and inequality-reducing. The eﬀect of such a transfer on GBET is clear, and the eﬀect
on the overlap R is also easy to discern for, in (10a)-(10b), both θ and µY are entirely
unaﬀected by money transfers. Suppose, then, that a small sum of money is transferred
from a single (household in group a) with money income u to a couple (household in
group b) with money income mv where v<u . For the relevant sub-intervals of [v,u],
we have ∆Fb(my) < 0 and ∆Fa(y) > 0,w h i l s tFb(my) and Fa(y) are unchanged outside
of those respective sub-intervals. Hence the eﬀect on R can be signed. If µa ≥
µb
m
,t h e n
from (10a), R goes up for such transfers (those from the on-average better-oﬀ singles to
the couples), and conversely goes down for progressive transfers in the opposite direction,
whilst if µa ≤
µb
m
the eﬀects are reversed (as is intuitive). (Compare this with the eﬀects
noted in Section 4b for within-group transfers).18
In Cowell (1980), who initiated the business of taking relevant diﬀerences into ac-
count in the measurement of inequality, the concept of a uniform horizontal transfer
(UHT) is expounded, and its eﬀect on inequality examined. This is a lump-sum transfer
from each member of one group to each member of the other. For Cowell’s decompos-
able inequality measures, the eﬀect of a UHT is shown to be independent of intra-group
distribution (page 526). Lambert (1992) shows that groupwise lump-sum transfers in an
unweighted and unscaled population are overall Lorenz-improving if and only if income
distribution in the donor group rank dominates that in the recipient group.
What happens in the general (weighted and scaled) case to the Gini coeﬃcient?
Suppose that an amount δ is taken from each member of group “a”, and that the total,
Naδ, is redistributed to the members of group “b” by lump-sum transfer, the amount









from (3) and (21)).
For assessing the eﬀect on GY it is as if each of q ﬁctional adults in the couple receives
θqδ
(1 − θ)m
. This is not a straight transfer unless q = m (one of Ebert’s points).19 The
eﬀect on GY can be expressed very succinctly:
µY .∆GY
δθ
=( 1− θ + θν)[1 − 2
Z




is the ratio of the weighting factor to the scaling factor (see the Appendix).
Clearly this eﬀect depends in general on within-group inequality through the term in
GY . For the Ebert (1997) procedure, we have q = m = mo > 1 and then ν =1in (27),
so that within-group inequality is not relevant.
18The eﬀects on within-group inequality are hard to determine (footnote 13 is relevant here). We
know, of course, from Ebert’s work that overall GY must fall.
19As an example, let p =
1
2 so that the two groups have equal size, and suppose that q =2and
m = mo =1
1
2 (this case falls under scenario (iii) in Ebert (1997), which Ebert does not favour). It
would be as if each marriage partner received 67 cents for every dollar donated to the couple by a single.






From this very straightforward expression, the Lambert (1992) result can be recovered
and extended. The two cases
Fb(y) ≥ Fa(y) ∀y and Fb(y) ≤ Fa(y) ∀y (29)
are those in which group “a” rank dominates group “b” and group “b” rank dominates

















We see that inequality is reduced when the donor group rank dominates, and is increased
when the recipient group rank dominates.
A much weaker condition than rank dominance is, however, necessary and suf-
ﬁcient for inequality reduction in this special case of the Gini coeﬃcient. Namely,
R
Fb(y)fa(y)dy must be greater than 1
2 - and that is all. This result may be most easily
understood in the literal case of singles and couples, as follows. A single with income y
would, if he or she were married to someone with no additional income, be given rank
Fb(y) in the distribution of couples’ incomes. Taking the expectation across all singles
of this artiﬁcial rank, the result may be less than, equal or greater than 1
2 -w h i c hi st h e
expected actual rank of a single among singles. If the artiﬁcial rank is greater than 1
2,
then singles would be placed at on-average higher ranks among couples than they actu-
a l l ye n j o yi nt h e i ro w ng r o u p .I nt h i sv e r ys p e c i ﬁc sense, singles would be “on average
richer” than couples - and our mathematics tells us that the groupwise transfer, being
from “richer” to “poorer”, would reduce inequality. This result is new, a by-product
of our analysis, though the measure
R
Fb(y)fa(y)dy crops up in some other literature.
For example, Gastwirth (1975) uses it to quantify the earnings diﬀerential between men
and women, and in Milanovic and Yitzhaki’s (2002) analysis of world income inequality,
R
Fb(y)fa(y)dy is used to compare relative well-being between geographical groupings
of countries.20




[1 − Fb(y)]fa(y)dy, in the case that “a” comprises
female workers and “b” males, as ‘the probability that a randomly chosen woman earns at least as much
as a randomly chosen man’ (page 33). He reports a value of 0.255 for the overall US white working
population in 1970 as against 0.243 in 1965, and also computes values in the range 0.165 to 0.307 for
a variety of industries in 1970. Milanovic and Yitzhaki describe the entries
U
Fb(y)fa(y)dy in their
table 7 (p. 165), in which “a” and “b” are groupings of countries, as ‘average rankings of members




2 then “a” can be seen as ‘a
richer group’ than “b”. Denoting this by a Â b, their table 7 implies inter alia that {W. Europe &
N. America}Â{Latin America & Caribbean}Â{E. Europe & former USSR}Â{Africa}Â{Asia}. The
directions in which groupwise lump-sum transfers would reduce the overall Gini coeﬃcient in these two
contexts are evident.
176 Conclusions
The Gini coeﬃcient is an abidingly popular and widely-used inequality index, despite
many perceived problems, notably with its subgroup decomposition. When the Gini
is decomposed across population subgroups, a residual term R arises, variously seen
as an “awkward interaction eﬀect” and “poorly speciﬁed” (to quote Mookherjee and
Shorrocks, 1982, and Shorrocks and Wan, 2004, respectively). Through the work un-
dertaken in this paper, we hope to have provided a path to the better understanding
of the Gini decomposition, and to have thereby underscored the positive role that this
index can play in certain types of inequality decomposition analysis.
We conﬁned attention to the case of two population subgroups for ease of presenta-
tion, but the results can clearly be extended. Our model permits for the incomes in one
group to be scaled, and that group’s population weight modiﬁed, before measuring over-
all inequality and decomposing it. By this extension, we covered scenarios mooted by
Cowell (1980) in which such transformations are suggested to take account of “relevant
diﬀerences” between groups. We also accommodated Ebert’s (1997) equivalization pro-
cedure, according to which the distribution of living standards across equivalent adults is
created by concomitant scaling and weighting in one group. However, our methodology
applies equally well in the absence of such scaling and weighting, when, for example,
“a”a n d“ b” could be age groups or regions.
In the general setting, we have provided simple analytics to quantify the Gini residual





which clearly capture the interaction between groups explicitly. We went on to analyze
theoretically the eﬀects on the Gini decomposition of weighting and scaling in various
scenarios. We thoroughly explored the relationships of our main ﬁndings to many of
those in the existing literature, drawing in, for example, the work of Cubel and Lambert
(2002) on the redistributive eﬀects of progression-neutral tax reforms, of Foster and
Shneyerov (2000) on an alternative concept of within-groups inequality, of Paglin (1975)
on the importance of the interaction term in the context of age groups, and of Federov
(2002) and a number of other authors on the links between polarization and between-
group inequality - as well as the aforementioned work of Cowell (1980) and Ebert (1997)
concerning socially relevant group diﬀerences.
In respect of the “awkward” and “poorly speciﬁed” Gini residual R per se, we have
furnished a number of results in this paper which surely go towards de-mystifying this
term. In particular, we have shown that: (a) within-group rich-to-poor transfers cannot
increase R, and will generally reduce it; (b) scaling up the incomes in the group with the
lower mean raises R (to a maximum value which occurs when the group means become
the same); (c) raising the population weight of one group relative to the other has an
eﬀect on R which can be straightforwardly determined; in the case of living standards
and equivalent adults, (d) a small money transfer from a single to a couple who are
18worse-oﬀ increases R if couples have on-average lower living standards (and vice versa);
and (e) if the equivalence scale deﬂator for couples is raised, thereby concomitantly
changing the number of equivalent adults in a couple-household, overlap falls if the
couples have a lower mean living standard than the singles (and vice versa).
Finally, we found a result quantifying the eﬀect on the overall Gini of one of Cowell’s
(1980) uniform horizontal transfers (a groupwise lump-sum transfer). This result, which
is new but has links with the work of Gastwirth (1975) and Milanovic and Yizhaki
(2002), provides a normatively clear sense in which one group may be characterized
as “richer” than another, and will surely be of interest to applied workers undertaking
inequality decomposition analysis.
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AA p p e n d i x
By adding in (5), we have
µY (1 + GY )=
Z
[1 + H(y)][1 − H(y)]dy.
Using (4), µY (1 + GY ) can then be written as
Z










[1 + Fb(my)][1 − Fb(my)]dy,
which come by adding in (1) and (2), to get:





[(1 + Fa(y))(1 − Fb(my)) + (1 + Fb(my))(1 − Fa(y))]dy,
from which (6) is immediate.
From (8)-(9):







[1 − Fb(my)Fa(y)]dy =
Z
[1 − Fb(my)]Fa(y)dy + µa =
Z
[1 − Fa(y)]Fb(my)dy +
µb
m















+2 θ(1 − ϕ).
Therefore GBET + R c a nb ew r i t t e na s :











Given the values of GBET stated in (10a)-(10b), (31) and (32) account for the expressions
for R.




µY (1 − ϕ)
m






























[yfa(y)+Fa(y)][1 − Fb(my)]dy (35)




m>m ∗ as claimed in the text. Now let m → m∗ in (33) and (34):




















1 − ϕ∗ +
R




where ϕ∗ is the value of ϕ when m = m∗ (i.e. ϕ∗ = θ from (7) since µa =
µb
m∗), and R∗
is the maximum overlap, deﬁned in (17). Substituting in (36) and (37) for ϕ∗ and R∗,
and using (2) along with
R
yFa(y)fa(y)dy = 1
2µa(1 +Ga) which follows from a result in
footnote 4 with b =1 , (18a)-(18b) follow.








































Substituting from (35) for the numerator integral, we have
∂R
∂M






1 − θ +
R







, and from (10b), straightforwardly, we have
∂R
∂M
















. These results explain (20).
When a constant amount is added to each income in a distribution with mean µ and
Gini coeﬃcient G,t h ee ﬀect on µG is null since µG is an index of absolute inequality.
Therefore in the UHT scenario, we have


















∆µY = θ∆µa +
(1 − θ)∆µb
m
= θδ(ν − 1).












provided δ is small. Thus from (6) it follows that











After integrating by parts, (40) comes down to
∆[µY (1 + GY )]
δθ
= −θ +( 1− θ)ν − 2(1 − θ + θν)
Z
Fb(my)fa(y)dy +2 θν. (41)
Now




= −θ +( 1− θ)ν − 2(1 − θ + θν)
Z
Fb(my)fa(y)dy +2 θν − (ν − 1)(1 + GY )
from which (27) is immediate.
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